[p. 246]
|246| ultimate truth is not in the form of thoughts and principles; rather, what is to count as right for the people can do so only insofar as it is something determinate, particular. For the people, this determinate element of right and ethical life has its ultimate confirmation only in the form of an existing religion, and if this is not connected with the principles of freedom, there is always the split and an unresolved rupture, a hostile relationship, which precisely ought not to take place in the state. Under Robespierre terror ruled in France, and indeed against those who were not of the disposition of freedom, because they were suspect, that is, for the sake of disposition. So too the ministry of Charles X was suspect. According to the formal side of the constitution the monarch was not subject to any responsibility; but this formal side did not hold: the dynasty was toppled from the throne. So it turns out that in the formally developed constitution the last sheet anchor is after all disposition, which had been set aside in it and now asserts itself in contempt of all form. It is from this contradiction, and from the prevailing unawareness of it, that our time suffers.
Transition to the following division
We have distinguished the determinate, limited cult and the cult in the element of freedom, and have thus found the same distinction that falls in general within the representation of God.
The two sides of spirit – in its objectivity, in which it is preeminently called God, and in its subjectivity – constitute the reality of the absolute concept of God, which, as the absolute unity of these two moments of its own, is absolute spirit. The determinacy in one of these sides corresponds to the other side; it is the pervading universal form in which the idea stands and which in turn
