[p. 219]
|219| and man would perhaps be the passive material, without being present. Rather the purpose, the divine, is to come to be in me through me, and what the action, which is my action, goes against is giving up myself altogether, who no longer keeps himself for himself. This twofold activity is the cult, and its purpose is thus the existence of God in man.
I am to make myself in accordance with this, that spirit dwell in me, that I be spiritual. This is my, the human work; the same is God’s from his side. He moves himself to man and is in him through the sublation of man. What appears as my doing is then God’s doing, and likewise conversely. This is admittedly opposed to the merely moral standpoint of Kant and Fichte; there the good is always first supposed to be brought forth, realized, with the determinacy that it also remains at the ought, as if it were not already there in and for itself. There, then, outside me is a world which, abandoned by God, waits for me first to bring the purpose, the good, into it. The circle of moral working is restricted. In religion, by contrast, the good, reconciliation, is absolutely accomplished and in and for itself; the divine unity of the spiritual and the natural world is presupposed – to the latter belongs particular self-consciousness -, and it is only a matter of me and against me, that I do away with my subjectivity and take my share in this work, which eternally accomplishes itself, and have my share in it. The good is accordingly not something that ought to be, but divine power, eternal truth.
Likewise, when nowadays one is always at pains to bring faith to people, and talk always aims at producing misery in them and thereby faith that God is, this is not only not cult; rather this, always wanting first to produce religion, is outside religion. The cult is rather within religion, and the knowing that
