[p. 186]
|186|
If, then, the first relationship of the finite to the infinite was the natural and untrue one, because the multitude and plurality of particularity was held fast against universality, and if we further see as the second relationship the one in reflection, where finitude lies in the wholly completed abstraction of pure thinking, which does not grasp itself actually as universal, but remains as I, as this one, then that relationship is to be considered as it reveals itself in reason.
γ. The Rational Consideration of Finitude
This standpoint is first to be considered as it stands in relationship with the form of reflection at its highest peak. The transition from this standpoint must by its nature be dialectical and be made dialectically; this, however, belongs to logic. We want to proceed by presenting it concretely and, as regards the necessity of the transition, appealing only to the own consistency of this standpoint. It says: I as finite am something null, which is to be sublated; but this sublation is surely not accomplished if this immediate singularity at the same time remains, and remains in such a way that only this I becomes the affirmative, as the standpoint of reflection states. The finite that enhances itself into the infinite is only abstract identity, empty within itself, the highest form of untruth, the lie and evil. A standpoint must therefore be pointed out where the I in this singularity in deed and actuality renounces itself. I must be particular subjectivity that is in fact sublated; thus something objective must be acknowledged by me which in fact counts for me as true, which is acknowledged as the affirmative, posited for me, in which I as this I am negated, but in which my freedom is at the same time preserved. The freedom of reflection is such as lets nothing arise within itself and, since it nevertheless must let something arise, proceeds in this positing without law and order,
