[p. 104]
|104| duties, the bonds of families and states, and leads them to ruin.
This is admittedly a most true and important consideration, which contains the essential, substantial connection. If now from that proposition, as the result of an experience, it is inferred: therefore religion is necessary, this is an external kind of inference, but can still be defective solely with regard to subjective cognition, so that the content is not thereby yet given a crooked turn or position. But if the inference now runs: therefore religion is useful for the ends of individuals, governments, states etc., a relationship is thereby introduced in which religion is posited as means. But with religion one is dealing with spirit, the many-sided. Just as already the organic body in its illnesses is at the same time, as to the remedies, indifferent in their speciality, however much they exercise a necessity of operation on it, and a choice among a multitude of remedies is open, so spirit even more degrades what it has as means and can use to something particular, and it then has the consciousness of its freedom to be able to use it or also another.
So if religion is a means, spirit knows that it can use it, but that it can also take hold of other means; indeed, it stands over against it in such a way that it can want to rely on itself. It further has the freedom of its ends – its force, cunning, mastery of people’s opinion etc. are also means -, and precisely in the freedom of its ends, which lies precisely in its ends being supposed to be what counts and religion only a means, it has the freedom to make its power and dominion its end, thus to set itself ends for which it can do without religion or which go precisely against it. What matters is rather that it should resolve upon, or know itself obliged to, such ends as, with setting aside
