[p. 145]
|145|
As soon, therefore, as representation makes a start at grasping an essential connection, it leaves it standing in the form of contingency and does not go on here to its true in-itself and to its eternal, self-interpenetrating unity. Thus in representation there is the thought of providence, and the movements of history are gathered together and grounded in the eternal counsel of God. But there the connection is at once transferred into a sphere where it is supposed to be incomprehensible and unsearchable for us. The thought of the universal is thus not determined within itself and, as soon as it is pronounced, is at once given up again.
Having seen the general determinacy of representation, this is the place to touch on the pedagogical question of recent times whether religion can be taught. Teachers who do not know what to do with the doctrines of religion hold instruction in it to be improper. But religion has a content that must be representable in an objective way. In this lies the fact that this represented content can be communicated, for representations are communicable through the word. It is something else to warm the heart, to stir up sensations; that is not teaching; that is an interesting of my subjectivity in something, and it can well make a rhetorical sermon, but it cannot be doctrine. If one does start from feeling, sets it as the first and original and then says that religious representations come from feeling, this is on the one hand correct insofar as the original determinacy lies in the nature of spirit itself. But on the other hand feeling is so indeterminate that everything can be in it, and the knowing of what lies in feeling does not belong to feeling itself, but is given only through cultivation and teaching, which communicate representation. Those educators want children and people in general to remain in their subjective sensation of love, and they represent the love of God to themselves like
