Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: The Concept of Religion

[p. 116]

|116| one certainty, and I would sublate my being, not know of myself, if I sublated that being. This unity of certainty is the inseparability of this content, which is different from me, and myself, the inseparability of both, which are distinguished from each other.

One can now stop here, and it is also asserted that one must stop at this certainty. But one at once makes, as happens with everything, this distinction: something can be certain; another question is whether it is true. Truth is set against certainty; in something being certain, it is not yet true.

The immediate form of this certainty is that of faith. Faith really has an opposition within itself, and this opposition is more or less indeterminate. Faith is set against knowing; if it is opposed to knowing in general, it is an empty opposition: what I believe I also know; that is content in my consciousness. Believing is a knowing; but by knowing one usually means a mediated, cognizing knowing.

More precisely, one calls a certainty faith insofar as it is partly not an immediate, sensuous certainty, partly insofar as this knowing is also not a knowing of the necessity of a content. What I see immediately before me I know: I do not believe that there is a sky above me; I see it. On the other hand, when I have rational insight into the necessity of a matter, we also do not say: I believe, e.g., in the Pythagorean theorem. There one presupposes that someone does not merely accept the proof of it on authority, but has seen into it.

In recent times faith has now been taken in the sense of certainty that stands in opposition to insight into the necessity of a content. That is especially the meaning of faith that Jacobi brought up. Thus Jacobi says: we only believe that we have a body; we do not know it. There knowing has this more precise meaning:

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