[p. 245]
|245| but in recent times the one-sidedness has come to light that on the one hand the constitution is supposed to support itself, and on the other disposition, religion, conscience are supposed to be set aside as indifferent, since it is no concern of the constitution which disposition and religion individuals profess. How one-sided this is, however, is evident from the fact that the laws are administered by judges, and then their integrity as well as their insight matter; for the law does not rule; human beings are to make it rule: this putting into action is something concrete; the will of human beings as well as their insight must contribute their share. The intelligence of the subject must also often decide because the civil laws carry determination very far and yet cannot touch every particular. But disposition for itself is likewise something one-sided, a defect from which Plato’s Republic suffers. In present times people do not want to rely on insight at all but want everything guided by positive laws. We have experienced a great example of this one-sidedness in the most recent history of the day: at the head of the French government a religious disposition was seen that was of such a kind that to it the state as such counted as something without right, and that it came forward with hostility against actuality, against right and ethical life. The last revolution5) was now the consequence of a religious conscience that contradicted the principles of the constitution, and yet according to the same constitution it is now not supposed to matter which religion the individual professes; this collision is still very far from being resolved.
5) Werkausgabe: July Revolution, 1830
Disposition does not necessarily take the form of religion; it can also remain more with the indeterminate. But in what is called the people, the
