[p. 117]
|117| acquaintance with necessity. Namely I see this – this, says Jacobi, is only a believing, for I intuit, feel; such a sensuous knowing is wholly immediate, unmediated, – there is no ground. Here faith in general has the meaning of immediate certainty.
So now the expression “faith” is used mainly of the certainty that there is a God, insofar as one does not have insight into the necessity of this content. Faith is to that extent something subjective, insofar as one calls the necessity of the content, its being proved, the objective, objective knowing, cognition. One believes in God insofar as one does not have insight into the necessity of this content, that he is what he is.
One also says “faith in God” according to ordinary usage because we have no immediate sensuous intuition of God. One does indeed also speak of a ground of faith, but that is already improperly spoken: if I have grounds, and indeed objective, proper grounds, it is proved to me. But the grounds themselves can be of a subjective nature; then I let my knowing count as a proved knowing, and insofar as these grounds are subjective, I say faith.
The first, simplest and still most abstract form of this subjective grounding is that in the being of the I the being of the object is also contained. This grounding and this appearance of the object is given as the first and immediate one in feeling.
1. The Form of Feeling
Cross-reference: On feeling as a mere form of the religious content cf. the Remark to § 270.
In this form the following determinations count at first: a) We know of God, and indeed immediately; God is not supposed to be comprehended; there is not supposed to be argument about God, because it would not work with rational cognition. b) We must ask for a hold for this knowing. We know only in ourselves; it is thus only subjective; therefore
