Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: The Concept of Religion

[p. 200]

|200| makes itself concrete and completes itself into the totality of its differences, so that the concept, in being only through these differences, becomes object to itself. The concept that we have thus established is the self-consciousness of absolute spirit, this self-consciousness that it is for itself; for itself it is spirit; that in which there is a difference of itself from itself is the moment of nature. Popularly spoken, this means: God is the unity of the natural and the spiritual; but spirit is lord of nature, so that both are not with equal dignity in this unity, but such that the unity is spirit, not a third in which both are neutralized; rather this indifference of both is itself spirit. It is at one time one side and at the other time that which overreaches the other side and is thus the unity of both. In this further concrete determination of spirit it happens that the concept of God completes itself into the Idea.

The spiritual is the absolute unity of the spiritual and the natural, so that the latter is only something posited, held by spirit. In this Idea there are the following moments: a) The substantial, absolute, subjective unity of both moments, the Idea in its self-equal affirmation. b) The distinguishing of spirit within itself, so that it now posits itself as being for this distinguished – posited by itself. c) Since this distinguishing is itself posited in that unity of affirmation, it becomes negation of the negation, affirmation as infinite, as absolute being-for-itself.

The first two moments are those of the concept, the way in which the relation of the spiritual and the natural is contained in the concept. The further point is that they are not merely moments of the concept, but themselves the two sides of the difference. The moment of distinguishing is in spirit what is called consciousness. Distinguishing is the positing of two that have no other determination of their difference than precisely those moments themselves. Distinguishing,

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