[p. 126]
|126| distinguished from myself; i.e. in this my feeling itself I am driven by its content into opposition, to reflection and to distinguishing subject and object.
This transition to reflection is not peculiar to religious feeling alone, but to human feeling in general. For man is spirit, consciousness, representing; there is no feeling that would not contain within itself this transition to reflection. In every other feeling, however, it is only the inner necessity and nature of the matter that drives to reflection; it is only this necessity that the I distinguishes itself from its determinacy. Religious feeling, on the other hand, contains in its content, in its determinacy itself, not only the necessity but the actuality of the opposition itself and thereby reflection. For the substance of the religious relationship is on the one hand the thinking of the universal, which is itself already reflection, then the other moment of my empirical consciousness, and the relation of the two. In religious feeling, therefore, I am externalized from myself, for the universal, thinking that is in and for itself, is the negation of my particular empirical existence, which by contrast appears as something null that has its truth only in the universal. The religious relationship is oneness, but contains the force of judgement. In feeling the moment of empirical existence, I feel that side of the universal, of negation, as a determinacy falling outside me; or, in being in this, I feel myself alienated from myself in my empirical existence, denying myself and negating my empirical consciousness.
Because the subjectivity contained in religious feeling is empirical, particular, it is in feeling in particular interest, in particular determinacy in general. Religious feeling itself contains this determinacy: that of empirical self-consciousness and of universal thinking and their relation and unity; it hovers
