[p. 128]
|128| noblest has its place in it. It is a matter of experience that feeling has the most contingent content; this can be the truest and the worst. God, when he is in feeling, has no advantage over the worst; rather the most royal flower sprouts on the same ground beside the most rampant weed. That a content is in feeling makes nothing excellent for it itself. For not only what is comes into our feeling, not merely the real, what is, but also the invented, the lied, all good and all bad, everything actual and everything non-actual is in our feeling; the most opposed is in it. All imaginings of objects I feel; I can be enthusiastic about the most unworthy. I have hope. Hope is a feeling; in it, as in fear, is the future, immediately such as is not yet, perhaps will only be, perhaps will never be. Likewise I can be enthusiastic about what is past, but also about what has neither been nor will be. I can imagine myself to be an able, great, a noble and excellent human being, capable of sacrificing everything for right, for my opinion; I can imagine I have been of much use, achieved much; but the question is whether it is true, whether I in fact act so nobly and really am as able as I imagine myself to be. Whether my feeling is of a true kind, good, depends on its content. That content is in feeling at all does not decide it; for the worst is in it too. Whether the content exists likewise does not depend on whether it is in feeling; for imagined things that have never existed and never will exist are in it. Feeling is accordingly a form for all possible content, and this content receives in it no determination that would concern its being in and for itself. Feeling is the form in which the content is posited as completely contingent, since it can be posited just as much by my liking, my arbitrariness, as by nature. The content thus has in feeling the form of not being determined in and for itself, not posited by the universal, not by
