[p. 212]
|212| these are testimonies that are no testimonies. The content of religion is the eternal nature of God, not such contingent, external things.
When Mendelssohn was called upon to convert to the Christian religion, he replied that his religion did not command him to believe in eternal truths, but only certain laws, modes of action, ceremonial laws; he regarded it as an advantage of the Jewish religion that eternal truths were not commanded in it; for reason sufficed to find these; those positive statutes had been laid down by God, but these eternal truths were the laws of nature, truths of mathematics and so on. – We must admittedly grant that they are eternal; but they are of very restricted content, are no content of eternal spirit in and for itself. Religion, however, must contain nothing other than religion, and as such contains only eternal truths of spirit; this is its determination. Those positive statutes then concern external modes of worship; or if these commandments of God concern moral actions, then again the spiritual, the disposition, is the main thing. But this commanding, at its highest peak, is the highest harshness and can become irreligious and relate to restricted content. What is to be believed, however, must have a religious, spiritual content.
3. Faith and attestation as mediation we have now determined in the concept of the cult as its inner, or as the first moments in it. In the cult God is on the one side, I on the other, and the determination is to join myself together with God within myself, to know myself in God as my truth and God in me – this concrete unity. For our consideration theoretical consciousness too is concrete, but only in itself; that it also become concrete for the subject is the practical. The cult is to give oneself this highest, absolute enjoyment, – there is feeling in it; there I am present with my
