[p. 148]
|148| have found comfort, satisfaction and dignity in it. To separate oneself from this authority is declared dangerous, and over against it the authority of one’s own opinion is set back. But this too is still a crooked turn: that one’s own conviction is thus subjected to the authority of the universal and calmed down against it. The reassurance lies only in the supposition that, as millions regard it, so it must surely be right, and there remains the possibility that the matter, if one looks at it once more, shows itself differently.
All these turns can be brought into the form of proofs of the truth of religion, and they have received this form from the apologists. But thereby only the form of argumentation and reflection is brought in, a form that does not concern the content of truth in and for itself, only points out credibilities, probabilities etc., and is able to grasp truth, instead of considering it in its being in and for itself, only in connection with other circumstances, events and states. Moreover, although apologetics with its argumentations passes over to thinking and inferring and wants to set up grounds that are supposed to be different from authority, its main ground is nevertheless again only an authority, namely the divine one, that God has revealed to men what is to be represented. Without this authority apologetics cannot move even for one moment, and this constant interplay of thinking, inferring and authority is essential to its standpoint. But as it is unavoidable on this standpoint that argumentation must go to infinity, so too that highest, divine authority is again one that itself first needs grounding and rests on an authority. For we were not there and did not see God when he revealed. It is always only others who tell us and assure us of it, and precisely the testimonies of these others, who experienced the historical or first
