[p. 196]
|196| is only for the pious, i.e. for one who at the same time is what he observes. Here it is the case that there is not merely observation at all; rather the observer is in a relationship to the object such that the observing is not a purely external one; he is not purely observer, not merely in a negative relationship to what he observes.
It follows from this that, in order to find the ground of religion, we must give up the relationship of observing; we must leave this empirical standpoint, precisely because it is only this and because, as we saw, it has sublated itself through itself. Reflection does have the relationship of the finite to the infinite; this, however, is itself posited only as a negation. It does go on to the demand to posit the finite as infinite, but it has been shown that this demand must be only in relation to the affirmative; i.e. in observation the finite is made into the infinite and yet has remained as finite and held fast. And at the same time the demand for the sublation of the finite is nevertheless present.
But now that the finite and the standpoint of reflection have sublated themselves for us, we have arrived at the standpoint of infinite observation and of the speculative concept, i.e. at the sphere in which the true concept of religion will open itself to us.
3. The Speculative Concept of Religion
Reason is the ground on which alone religion can be at home. The basic determination is the affirmative behaviour of consciousness, which is only as negation of the negation, as the self-sublation of the determinations of opposition that are taken by reflection as persisting. The ground of religion is to that extent this rational element and more precisely the speculative. Religion, however, is not only such an abstraction, an affirmative behaviour towards the universal as just determined; if it were only that, all
