Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: The Concept of Religion

[p. 144]

|144| representation through the form that its inner determinations are grasped as they relate simply to themselves and are in the form of independence.

When we say: God is all-wise, good, just, we have determinate content; but each of these determinations of content is single and independent; “and”, “also” is the mode of connection of representation. All-wise, all-good are also concepts; they are no longer something pictorial, sensuous or historical, but spiritual determinations; but they are not yet analysed within themselves, and the differences are not yet posited as they relate to one another, but taken only in abstract, simple relation to themselves. Insofar as the content does indeed already contain manifold relations within it, but the relation is only external, external identity is thereby posited. “Something is this, then that, then it is thus”; these determinations thus at first have the form of contingency.

Or if representation contains relationships that are already closer to thought, e.g. that God created the world, the relationship is still grasped by it in the form of contingency and externality. Thus in the representation of creation God remains on the one side for himself, the world on the other, but the connection of the two sides is not posited in the form of necessity; it is expressed either according to the analogy of natural life and happening or, when it is designated as creation, designated as one that is supposed to be wholly peculiar and incomprehensible for itself. But if one uses the expression “activity” from which the world has proceeded, this is indeed something more abstract, but not yet the concept. The essential content stands firm for itself in the form of simple universality in which it is enveloped, and its passing over through itself into an other, its identity with an other, is lacking to it; it is only identical with itself. The single points lack the bond of necessity and the unity of their difference.

Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157

DE