[p. 238]
|238| this it is expressed that these laws of ethical life and of right are eternal and unchangeable rules for human conduct, that they are not arbitrary but endure as long as religion itself. We find the representation of this connection among all peoples. It can also be expressed in the form that one obeys God by following the laws and the authorities, the powers that hold the state together. This proposition is on the one hand correct, but it is also exposed to the danger that it can be taken quite abstractly, since it is not determined how the laws are explicated and which laws are appropriate for the fundamental constitution; expressed so formally, that proposition means: one is to obey the laws, be they what they may. Governing and legislating are in this way left to the arbitrariness of the government.
This relationship has occurred in Protestant states, and it can take place only in such states, for there that unity of religion and state is present. The laws of the state count as rational and as something divine because of this presupposed original harmony, and religion does not have its own principles contradicting those that hold in the state. But when one stops at the formal, free scope is thereby given to arbitrariness, tyranny and oppression. This came to light especially in England (under the last kings of the house of Stuart), when a passive obedience was demanded and the proposition held that the ruler owed an account of his actions to God alone. The presupposition here is that only the ruler also determinately knows what is essential and necessary for the state; for in him, in his will, lies the more precise determination that he is an immediate revelation of God. Through further consequence, however, this principle was developed to the point where it turned into its opposite; for the distinction between priests and laity is not present among
