[p. 143]
|143| such a myth contains an allegory, like the myths of Plato.
Every history in general contains this external series of events and actions; but these are events of a human being, of a spirit. The history of a state is action, doing, fate of a universal spirit, of the spirit of a people. Such a thing already has something universal within it in and for itself; if one takes it in the superficial sense, it can be said: one can draw a moral from every history.
The moral that is drawn from it contains at least the essential ethical powers that worked in it, that brought it about. These are the inner, the substantial. History thus has this isolated side, the single, individualized to the utmost; but in it the universal laws, powers of the ethical are also recognizable. These are not for representation as such: for it history is in the way it presents itself as history and is in appearance.
In such history, however, there is something even for the human being whose thoughts, concepts have not yet received determinate development; he feels these powers in it and has an obscure consciousness of them. In such a way religion is essentially for ordinary consciousness, for consciousness in its ordinary development. It is a content that presents itself at first sensuously, a sequence of actions, sensuous determinations that follow one another in time, then stand side by side in space. The content is empirical, concrete, manifold, but it also has an inner; there is spirit in it that works on spirit: subjective spirit bears witness to the spirit that is in the content, at first through obscure acknowledgement, without this spirit being developed for consciousness. c) All spiritual content, relationship in general, is finally
