[p. 243]
|243| in a true way. Religion demands the sublation of the will; the secular principle, by contrast, takes the will as its foundation; if those religious principles assert themselves, it cannot happen otherwise than that governments proceed with force and suppress the opposing religion or treat those who belong to it as a party. Religion as church may well be clever and outwardly yielding, but then inconsistency enters people’s minds. The world holds fast to a determinate religion and at the same time clings to opposed principles; insofar as one carries these out and yet still wants to belong to that religion, this is a great inconsistency. Thus the French, for example, who hold fast to the principle of secular freedom, have in fact ceased to belong to the Catholic religion, for this can give up nothing but consistently demands in everything unconditional submission to the church. Religion and state stand in contradiction in this way: religion is then left lying to one side, it may fare as it will; it counts only as a matter for individuals with which the state need not concern itself, and then it is further said that religion is not to be mixed into the constitution of the state. The positing of those principles of freedom claims that they are true because they are connected with the innermost self-consciousness of the human being. But if it is indeed reason that finds these principles, then it has their verification, insofar as they are true and do not remain formal, only in leading them back to the knowledge of absolute truth, and this is the object of philosophy alone; but philosophy must have gone back completely and to the final analysis, for if knowledge does not complete itself within itself, it is exposed to the one-sidedness of formalism; but if it goes to the ultimate ground, it comes to what is recognized as the highest, as God. So it can well be said that the constitution should remain on one side, religion
