[p. 174]
|174| of the substantial nature of the action is not needed. But if everything depends solely on that consciousness, I can really commit no fault at all; for I am only affirmative to myself, while the division remains formal, a semblance that does not cloud my essential inner. My longing, my emotion is the substantial. In this standpoint lie all the views of recent times since the Kantian philosophy, which first set up this faith in the good.
This is the standpoint of subjective consciousness, which develops the oppositions that concern consciousness, but which remain in it and which it keeps in its power, because it is the affirmative.
Now it is to be considered what finitude in general is and what true relationship the finite has to the infinite; that the human spirit is finite we hear assured daily. We want to speak of finitude first in the popular sense one means when one says man is finite, then of its true sense and the rational view of it.
There are three forms in which finitude appears, namely in sensuous existence, in reflection, and in the way it is in spirit and for spirit.
α. Finitude in Sensuous Existence
That man is finite has at first the sense: I, man, relate myself to something other; there is present an other, a negative of myself, with which I stand in connection, and that makes up my finitude; we are both exclusive and behave independently towards each other. So I am as sensuously sensing; everything living is exclusive in this way. In hearing and seeing I have only something single before me, and behaving practically I always have to do only with single things; the objects of my satisfaction are likewise single. This is the standpoint of natural being, of natural existence; according to it I am
